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98

if requested by a party in accordance with Section 4, the court must
take judicial notice of foreign law; if not so requested, the court may
or may not do so, at its option.
ROBERT CLAWSON

TORTS: DOG OWNER'S LIABILITY IN FLORIDA
Florida Laws 1949, c. 25109
In 1892 Florida enacted its first statute relative to the liability of
dog owners.' This remained in force as the only legislative enactment
on the subject until the present law was passed. 2 Some difficulties
are always encountered in the construction of new statutes modifying or abrogating the common law; but this one in particular presents a knotty problem in that it is subject to several conflicting interpretations, yet these could not all have been within the legislative
intent. Unfortunately the new statute contains none of the repealing
provisions employed by skilled draftsmen.
I.

LiBrriTy AT COMMON LAW

In the common law of England as adopted by Florida, the liability of dog owners had become relatively well settled. In 1747, in
'FLA. REv. GEN. STAT. §2341 (1892).
2

"The owners of any dog which shall bite any person, while such person is
on or in a public place, or lawfully on or in a private place, including the
property of the owner of such dogs, shall be liable for such damages as
may be suffered by persons bitten, regardless of the former viciousness of
such dog or the owners' knowledge of such viciousness. A person is lawfully
upon private property of such owner within the meaning of this act when
he is on such property in the performance of any duty imposed upon him
by the laws of this State or by the laws or postal regulations of the United
States of America, or when he is on such property upon invitation, expressed
or implied, of the owner thereof; 'Provided, however, no owner of any dog
shall be liable for any damages to any person or his property when such
person shall mischievously or carelessly provoke or aggravate the dog inflicting
such damage; nor shall any such owner be so liable if at the time of any
such injury he had displayed in a prominent place on his premises a sign
easily readable including the words "Bad Dog".'
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Smith v. Pelah,3 Chief Justice Lee laid down in unequivocal terms
the proposition that it is a wrong to humanity to keep in existence
a dog known to be vicious, and that if subsequently the dog bites a
person its owner is liable. The knowledge of the dog's vicious propen-4
sities by the owner, the element of scienter, is the gist of the action.
The converse of this proposition was equally true; in Mason v.
Keeling 5 Chief Justice Holt stated that an owner who lacked knowledge of the vicious tendency of his dog would not be liable. The
element of scienter, however, does not require that the dog must
previously have bitten a person 6 or that the owner must have actual
notice of this fact; 7 the owner's knowledge of the dangerous propensities of the animal is sufficient. The underlying theory behind the
liability was that it is a nuisance to keep a dangerous animal, negligence in the manner of keeping being immaterial in establishing that
liability. These propositions were reaffirmed with emphasis by English
courts in the middle of the nineteenth century."
In an almost unwavering line, American decisions have subscribed
to this doctrine:
1. There is liability at common law with scienter, 9 and none
in its absence.' 0
32 Strange 1264, 93 Eng. Rep. 1171 (1747).
41d. at 1264. "The Chief Justice [Lee] ruled that if a dog has once bit a
man, and the owner having notice thereof keeps the dog, and lets him go
about, or lie at his door; an action will lie against him at the suit of a person
who is bit, though it happened by such person's treading on the dog's toes,
for it was owing to his not hanging the dog on the first notice. And the safety
of the King's subjects ought not afterwards to be endangered. The scienter is
the git [gist] of the action."
5See 1 Ld. Raym. 606, 608, 91 Eng. Rep. 1305, 1307 (1700).
6Jenkins v. Turner, 1 Ld. Raym. 109, 91 Eng. Rep. 969 (1696).
7Jones v. Perry, 2 Esp. 482, 170 Eng. Rep. 427 (1796).
SApplebee v. Percy, L. R. 9 C. P. 647 (1847); Read v. Edwards, 17 C. B.
N. S. 245, 144 Eng. Rep. 99 (1864); Card v. Case, 5 C. B. 622, 136 Eng. Rep.
1022 (1848); Jackson v. Smithson, 15 M. & W. 563, 153 Eng. Rep. 973 (1846);
May v. Burdett, 9 Q. B. 101, 115 Eng. Rep. 1213 (1846).
9Durden v. Barnett, 7 Ala. 169 (1844); Laverone v. Mangianti, 41 Cal.
138 (1871); F. Giovannozzi & Sons, Inc. v. Luciani, 2 Terry 211, 18 A.2d 435
(Del. 1941); Hays v. Anchors, 71 Ga. App. 280 (1944); Hapke v. Huston, 301
Ill. App. 191, 22 N. E.2d 124 (1939); Kightlinger v. Egan, 75 Ill. 141 (1874);
Partlow v. Haggarty, 35 Ind. 178 (1871); Perkins v. Mossman, 44 N. J. L. 579
(1882); Kelly v. Tilton, 2 Abb. Dec. 495, 3 Keyes 263 (N. Y. 1866).
1OHensley v. McBride, 112 Cal. App. 50, 296 Pac. 316 (1931); Warner v.
Chamberlain, 7 Houst. 18, 30 At. 638 (Del. 1884); Candler v. Smith, 50 Ga.
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2. To establish scienter, knowledge need not be certain that the
dog bit a person; it is sufficient that the owner or keeper
had notice of the animal's savage disposition. 1
3. The action is predicated upon maintenance of a nuisance and
2
not on the negligent manner of keeping.'
Although the courts in applying the common law agree on these
general principles, seeming differences of opinions have arisen because these doctrines do not provide a complete test for determining
liability. A clear illustration of this fact is afforded by consideration
of contributory negligence.
3
In most courts the defense of contributory negligence is allowed,' 4
but a minority of the courts have held that it does not bar recovery.1
What appears at first glance to be a conflict, however, stems from
the different meanings attached by the various courts to the term
App. 667, 179 S. E. 395 (1935); Moss v. Pardridge, 9 I1. App. 490 (1881);
Goode v. Martin, 57 Md. 606 (1882); Lamanna v. Kennedy, 130 N. J. L. 223,
32 A.2d 446 (1943); Kennet v. Sossnitz, 260 App. Div. 759, 23 N. Y. S.2d
961 (1940), aj'd, 286 N. Y. 623, 36 N. E.2d 459 (1941); Looney v. Bingham
Dairy, 70 Utah 398, 260 Pac. 855 (1927); Robinson v. Marino, 3 Wash. 434,
28 Pac. 752 (1892); Kertsebacke v. Ludwig, 28 Wis. 430 (1871); Thomas v.
Morgan, 2 C. M. & R. 496, 150 Eng. Rep. 214 (1835).
"Perazzo v. Ortega, 29 Ariz. 334, 241 Pac. 518 (1925); Hanson v. Carroll,
133 Conn. 505, 52 A.2d 700 (1947); Warner v. Chamberlain, 7 Houst. 18, 30
Ad. 638 (Del. 1884); Kennett v. Engle, 105 Mich. 693, 63 N. W. 1009 (1895);
v. Williams, 24 R. I. 583, 54 Ad. 381 (1903).
Peck
12
Turner v. Shropshire, 285 Ky. 256, 147 S. W.2d 388 (1941); Patterson
v. Rosenwald, 222 Mo. App. 973, 6 S. W.2d 664 (1928); Tidal Oil Co. v.
Forcum, 189 Okla. 268, 116 P.2d 572 (1941); Jaco v. Baker, 174 Ore. 191,
148 P.2d 938 (1944).
18 Kelley v. Killourey, 81 Conn. 320, 70 At. 1031 (1908); Feldman v.
Sellig, 110 II. App. 130 (1903); Dockerty v. Hutson, 125 Ind. 102, 25 N. E.
144 (1890); Bush v. Wathen, 104 Ky. 548, 47 S. W. 599 (1890); Tasker v.
Arey, 114 Me. 551, 96 AU. 737 (1916); Ryan v. Marren, 216 Mass. 556, 104
N. E. 353 (1914); Muller v. McKesson, 10 Hun 44 (1877), affd, 73 N. Y.
195, 29 Am. Rep. 123 (1878); Brown v. Barber, 26 Tenn. App. 534, 174 S. W.2d
298 (1943); Badali v. Smith, 37 S. W. 642 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896); Schraeder
v. Koopman, 190 Wis. 459, 209 N. W. 714 (1926).
14Muller v. McKesson, 10 Hun 44 (1877), aff'd, 73 N. Y. 195, 29 Am. Rep.
123 (1878); Brewer v. Furtwangler, 171 Wash. 617, 18 P.2d 837, 838 (1933):
"The terms 'negligence' and 'contributory negligence' are employed, for convenience and not in a strictly legal sense, in actions of the class in which the
case at bar falls. The ground of liability in an action for injuries caused by a
vicious dog is not negligence in the ordinary sense, hence, in its ordinary
meaning, contributory negligence is not a defense."
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"contributory negligence." In those jurisdictions that allow this defense, the term denotes action by the plaintiff that amounts to either
(1) an assumption of risk, as illustrated by the case in which the
adult plaintiff, after being warned to stay away from a snarling
dog, deliberately and without reason goes into the area in which
the dog is kept and is bitten;' 5 or (2) actual causation of the injury,
as appears in an instance in which a child strikes a dog while it is
eating and the dog snaps back, biting and injuring the child. 6 The
courts that reject contributory negligence as a defense employ the
term in the sense of inadvertence, carelessness, or want of ordinary
care, that is, negligence as usually understood in the law. 17 Consequently there is no real disagreement between the two views.
Another instance of a difference more apparent than real is foumd
in the theory upon which the liability is to be grounded. Numerous
American opinions state with monotonous regularity that the very
keeping of a dog known to be vicious or prone to mischief is the
gist of the action. 18 Some modem cases, however, base the action
on nuisance.' 9 In essence, both views are proceeding upon the same
basis; the modem cases merely designate by a new name what the
previous decisions always effected in practice. Under neither terminology is the absence of negligence, in the proper sense, a defense.
Whether the presence of a warning sign is sufficient to enable
the owner of a ferocious dog to escape liability is a question that
has likewise been given various answers. Most courts, when confronted with this question, have held that the presence of such a
sign is no defense against one not a wrongdoer.2 0 In the leading
case, Sarch v. Blackburn,2 ' plaintiff was allowed to recover even
though a sign was displayed, but proof of his illiteracy may well
luBrown v. Barber, 26 Tenn. App. 534, 174 S. W.2d 298 (1943).
16 Feldman v. Sellig, 110 IMI.App. 180 (1903).
17Falke v. Addicks, 45 Minn. 37, 47 N. W. 450 (1890); Lynch v. McNally,
7 Daly 126 (1877), aff'd, 73 N. Y. 347 (1878); Muller v. McKesson, 10 Hun 44
(1877), affd, 73 N. Y. 195, 29 Am. Rep. 123 (1878); Tubbs v. Shears, 55
Okla.
610, 155 Pac. 549 (1916).
18 Ahlstrand v. Bishop, 88 Ill.
App. 424 (1899); Partlow v. Haggarty, 35 Ind.
178 (1871); Lynch v. McNally, 7 Daly 126 (1877), aff'd, 73 N. Y. 347 (1878);
Card v. Case, 5 C. B. 622, 186 Eng. Rep. 1022 (1848); Blackman v. Simmons,

3 C. &P. 138 (1827).
19 See
20

note 12 supra.
For meaning of wrongdoer in this sense see p. 103 infra.
214 C. & P. 298, 172 Eng. Rep. 712 (1830).
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have influenced or even controlled the result. Subsequent decisions
overlooked this important fact completely and held that the presence
of notice is immaterial, 22 provided plaintiff does not deliberately
fly into danger in spite of a warning. When he does so, it has been
held, in the only two cases found on this precise point,23 that his
action constitutes an assumption of risk. But the mere presence of
a sign, if unread, constitutes no defense. And, since oversight seems
to be a failing peculiar to most plaintiffs in actions of this kind,
failure to take note of the warning sign is almost invariably pleaded.
Accordingly, plaintiff can maintain his action successfully even
though notice is posted.
Actual ownership of the dog is immaterial, according to the great
majority of cases. 24 Both the owner and the possessor of the dog
25
can be held jointly and severally liable for any injuries caused.
Furthermore, a property owner who allows his premises to be
used by another to harbor a dog is also responsible at common law
26
for any injuries.
An exception to the strict liability of the owner for the very
keeping of an animal known to be dangerous is made in those
instances in which a watchdog is kept for protection of the home
and property. This right has been recognized from early times and
has often been reaffirmed. 27 This exception is narrowly confined,
however; night is the only time when an owner may, with impunity,
permit a vicious dog to run loose on his premises, even for the pur22

Burke v. Fischer, 298 Ky. 157, 182 S. W.2d 638 (1944); Kingsley v.
Yocom, 34 Ohio App. 226, 170 N. E. 180 (1929); Brewer v. Furtwangler, 171
Wash. 617, 18 P.2d 837 (1933).
2
3Spellman v. Dyer, 186 Mass. 176, 71 N. E. 295 (1904); Brown v. Barber,
26 Tenn.
App. 534, 174 S. W.2d 298 (1943).
24
Smith v. Royer, 181 Cal. 165, 183 Pac. 660 (1919); Wilkinson v. Parrott,
32 Cal. 102 (1867); McCarthy v. Daanis, 117 Conn. 307, 167 Ad. 918 (1933);

Jones v. Carey, 9 Houst. 214, 31 At. 976 (Del. 1891); White v. Sens, 13 La.
App. 343, 127 So. 413 (1980); Merritt v. Matchett, 135 Mo. App. 176, 115
S. W. 1066 (1909); Bundschuh v. Mayer, 81 Hun 111, 30 N. Y. Supp. 622
Miller v. Reeves, 101 Wash. 642, 172 Pac. 815 (1918).
(1894);
25

Rosenblatt v. Bosse, 50 Ohio App. 449, 198 N. E. 636 (1934).
Missio v. Williams, 129 Tenn. 504, 167 S. W. 473 (1914).
27
Netusil v. Novak, 120 Neb. 751, 285 N. W. 335 (1931); Woodbridge v.
Marks, 17 App. Div. 139, 45 N. Y. Supp. 156 (1897); Loomis v. Terry, 17
Wend. 496 (N. Y. 1837); Sarch v. Blackburn, 4 C. & P. 298, 172 Eng. Rep.
712 (1830); Brock v. Copeland. 1 Esp. 203 (1794).
26
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pose of safeguarding them.2 8 A person injured during the day can
recover for injuries unless he is clearly a wrongdoer. 29 In this situation the injured person is not considered a wrongdoer unless he is
engaged in the commission of a criminal act or a tort against the
person of the dog owner, members of his household, or his property.3 0 Furthermore, a mere technical trespasser is not considered
a wrongdoer in this sense, and will not be denied recovery if he is
bitten by a watchdog.31 Presumably the dog is supposed to know
the law and the intent of the trespasser.
II. Emcr

OF STATuES IN OTHER JurmsDlC-noNs

It is often difficult and sometimes impossible to prove the essential
element of scienter. This is the chief reason ascribed32 to the action
taken by the fifteen jurisdictions3 3 with statutes defining the liability
of owners of dogs that injure humans. The courts of one such state
have often declared that the statute is intended merely to restate

28

See Montgomery v. Koester, 35 La. Ann. 1091, 1093, 48 Am. Rep. 253,
254 (1883); McCaskill v. Elliot, 5 Strob. L. 196, 53 Am. Dec. 706, 708 (S. C.
1850); Loomis v. Terry, 17 Wend. 496, 498 (N. Y. 1837).
29
Conway v. Grant, 88 Ga. 40, 13 S. E. 803 (1891); Kelly v. Tilton, 3
Keyes 263, 2 Abb. Dec. 495 (N. Y. 1866).
3
ODorman v. Carlson, 106 Conn. 200, 137 Ad. 749 (1927); Conway v.
Grant, 88 Ga. 40, 13 S. E. 803 (1891).
3
lConway v. Grant, supra note 30; Carroll v. Marcoux, 98 Me. 259, 56 At.
848 (1903); Carrow v. Haney, 203 Mo. App. 485, 219 S. W. 710 (1920);
Leonorovitz v. Ott, 40 Misc. 551, 82 N. Y. Supp. 880 (1903); Eider v. White,
65 N. Y. 54 (1875); Kelly v. Tilton, 3 Keyes 263, 2 Abb. Dec. 495 (N. Y.
1866); Kingsley v. Yocom, 34 Ohio App. 226, 170 N. E. 180 (1929); Darby
v. Clare Food & Relish Co., 111 Pa. Super. 537, 170 At. 387 (1934).
32
Malafronte v. Miloni, 35 R. I. 225, 86 AtI. 146, 147 (1913): "One purpose, and possibly the main purpose, of this statute was to relieve plaintiffs
from the burden of proving knowledge, which was frequently difficult for
them to do; their inability in that regard often resulting practically in a denial
of justice."
33
Ar.A CODE ANN. tit. 3, §3 (1940); CAL. Gsq. LAws act 384a, §1 (1943);
CoNN. GEN. STAT. §3404 (1949); Fla. Laws 1949, c. 25109; GA. CODE §§105-110
(1933); IowA CODE §351.28 (1946); Mr.. REv. STAT. c. 88, §15 (1944); MAss.
Gam. LAws c. 140, §155 (1942); N. H. REv. LAws c. 180, §23 (1942); N. J.
REv. STAT. §4:19-7 (1937); Omao GEaN. CODE ANN. §5838 (1945); R. I. Gm.
LAws c. 639, §3 (1938); UTH REv. STAT. §24-0-1 (1933); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§2145 (1943); Wis. STAT. §174.02 (1947).
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the common law. 34 But the enactments of the other states3" modify
or abrogate the common-law liability, as their courts have frequently
stated.3 6 The general effect of these statutes, as judicially interpreted, is to obviate the necessity of proof by the plaintiff that the dog
is in fact vicious and that the owner already knew or should have
known of this trait. Recovery is allowed merely on the basis of
allegations that the defendant owned a dog, or kept a dog, or even
permitted a dog to be harbored on his premises, and that it bit the
plaintiff. This suggests absolute liability; but only one state, Ohio,
37
has specifically so held.
III.

LIABILITY IN FLORIDA UNDER STATUTE OF

1892

The statute first enacted in 189238 was included as Section 7044
of Compiled General Laws, 1927, and was reenacted in 1941.3 9 Surprisingly little litigation arose thereunder, the single reported case
being Ferguson v. Gangwer,40 and even in it the action was brought
at common law. The declaration contained three counts, one of
which failed to allege viciousness and scienter. The jury failed to
specify the count on which its verdict was based. The Court, nevertheless, held that, although such allegations were essential to the
older common-law declaration, they were no longer necessary for
recovery, inasmuch as Section 7044 of Compiled General Laws, 1927,
was in effect; defendant was necessarily on notice as to the existence
of this statute and was responsible for any damage done by his dog
to the plaintiff.
The clear language in this opinion demonstrates a recognition by
the Court that the 1892 statute was intended to modify the former
common-law necessity of allegation and proof of viciousness of the
34

Hays v. Anchors, 71 Ga. App. 280, 30 S. E.2d 646 (1944).
note 33 supra.
Luick v. Sondrol, 200 Iowa 728, 205 N. W. 331 (1925); Pressey v. Wirth,

35
See
36

3 Allen 191 (Mass. 1861); Rowland v. Wunderlick, 113 N. J. L. 223, 174
Atl. 168 (1934); Cries v. Zeck, 24 Ohio St. 329 (1873); Peck v. Williams, 24 R. I.
583, 54 AtI. 381 (1908); Legault v. Malacker, 156 Wis. 507, 145 N. W.
1081 (1914).
37Dragonette v. Brandes, 135 Ohio St. 223, 20 N. E.2d 367 (1939); Kleyv. Buffon, 89 Ohio St. 61, 105 N. E. 192 (1913).
38
FLA. REv. GEN. STAT. §2341 (1892).
39
FLA. STAT. §767.01 (1949).
40140 Fla. 704, 192 So. 196 (1939).

bolte
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dog and knowledge thereof by the owner. Therefore, under the law
of Florida as it stood prior to the 1949 statute, a plaintiff, in order
to recover, was required merely to allege that he was bitten by a
dog owned by the defendant and that injury from the bite resulted.
Since statutes enacted in derogation of the common law are to
be strictly construed,41 it necessarily follows that until 1949 the liability of the dog owner remained as it was at common law with the
exception of the change made in 1892. It follows that these principles
governed the liability of the defendant:
1. He was not liable if the plaintiff assumed the risk or deliberately caused the injury.
2. He was not liable if the plaintiff was bittten while engaged
in the commission of a crime or of a tort other than a technical
trespass.
3. He was liable regardless of his care in the manner of keeping or securing the animal.
4. He was liable even though a warning sign was posted.
5. He was liable irrespective of scienter or indeed of any prior
viciousness of the dog.
IV.

LARBILTY UNDER

CAPTR

25109, FLORIDA LAWS 1949

The 1949 statute purports in its title to create liability of the dog
owner and to provide for recovery of damages by persons bitten by
dogs. It provides two situations for recovery. The first arises when
the injured person is on public property; the second, when he is lawfully upon private property.
Under the statute a person is lawfully on private property when
he is performing duties imposed upon him by the laws of Florida or
by laws or postal regulations of the United States, or when he is
there pursuant to the express or implied invitation of the property
owner. Thus, under the specific words of the statute, the only person
lawfully on private property, and therefore the only person protected,
is an invitee. The Florida Supreme Court has at least recognized that
three types of persons come upon private property, 4 2 namely, in4'Ex parte Amos, 93 Fla. 5, 112 So. 289 (1927); Hainlin v. Budge, 56 Fla.
342, 47 So. 825 (1908); Thalheim v. Camp Phosphate Co., 48 Fla. 190, 37
So. 523 (1904).
42
Fred Howland, Inc. v. Morris, 143 Fla. 189, 196 So. 472 (1940); Southern
Express Co. v. Williamson, 66 Fla. 286, 63 So. 433 (1913); J. G. Christopher
Co. v. Russell, 63 Fla. 191, 58 So. 45 (1912).
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vitees, 43 licensees, 44 and trespassers, even though it has failed to
define these classes. Consequently, under the 1949 statute, licensees
and trespassers are not protected if bitten while on private property.
In the new statute, as in that of 1892, 4 the element of scienter is
unnecessary.
Two defenses are allowed the dog owner under the 1949 statute:
(1) provocation of the dog by the plaintiff; and (2) the display by
the dog owner, in a prominent place on his premises, of a sign
easily readable and containing the words "Bad Dog." The first of
these defenses was always recognized at common law.4 6 Under the
statute it is still a general defense and is available whether the
injury is sustained on public or private property. The second defense
is of course unavailable unless the injury occurs on private property.
The 1949 statute contains no repealing provisions. Accordingly it
repeals, if at all, by implication; and repeal of this nature is limited
to those provisions of other statutes in direct conflict, or, as is sometimes said, provisions that are repugnant to or irreconcilable with
the later enactment. 4" Furthermore, statutes in derogation of the
common law are strictly construed. 48 The 1949 statute, however,
does abrogate the common law by limiting recovery to invitees;
logically, to this extent, it also repeals by implication the 1892 statutory provisions. In addition, it provides a new defense in the form
of the posting of a warning sign. The overall effect, however, is not
free from doubt.

43

Petree v. Davison-Paxon-Stokes Co., 30
698 (1928): "An invitation of the owner or
by law where the person goes on the premises
of the owner or occupant, or in a matter of

Ga. App. 490, 118 S. E. 697,
occupant of premises is implied
for the benefit, real or supposed,

mutual interest, or in the usual
course of business, or for the performance of some duty. To constitute one

person an invitee of the other there must be some mutuality of interest."
44
McCall v. McCallie, 48 Ga. App. 99, 100, 171 S. E. 843, 845 (1933): "A
licensee is a person who is neither a customer, nor a servant, nor a trespasser,

and who does not stand in any contractual relation with the owner of the
premises, and who is permitted, expressly or impliedly, to go thereon merely

for his own interest, convenience, or gratification."
45

Ferguson v. Gangwer, 140 Fla. 704, 192 So. 196 (1939), construing FLA.
COMP. GE. LAws §7044 (1927), now FLA. STAT. §767.01 (1949).
46
See
47

note 13 supra.
Sanders v. Howell, 73 Fla. 563, 74 So. 802 (1917); Stewart v. DeLandLake
Helen Special Road & Bridge Dist., 71 Fla. 158, 71 So. 42 (1916).
48
See note 41 supra.
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V.

CONCLUSION

It is difficult to determine with certitude, from a mere consideration of the 1949 statute, the precise extent to which it modifies preexisting law. Four distinct possibilities present themselves.
Protection of persons bitten by dogs might be confined strictly
to those enumerated in the statute, thereby limiting recovery to
invitees. This construction, if followed, marks a new step in Amerisince no other state has gone this far in restrictcan jurisprudence,
49
liability.
ing
Another possibility is that this statute is intended merely to
supplement the common law, by enabling invitees to bring actions
under the statute if they so desire. Under the new statutory action,
however, the posting of a warning sign is a defense; and in all probability actions would be brought under the common law.
A third possible construction is that this statute applies to invitees
only. This would render the two statutory defenses available against
invitees alone; trespassers and licensees would have their original
common-law action, with the statutory defense of posting a warning
sign unavailable against them. It seems improbable that the Court
will adopt this view, since to do so places licensees and trespassers
in a favored position.
The fourth and most reasonable construction is that the statute
abrogates and modifies the common law only in so far as the latter
is repugnant.50 Invitees can bring their action under the 1949 statute,
while licensees and trespassers must resort to their common-law
remedies. In either event, however, the defenses provided for the dog
owner should apply, and scienter should no longer be a necessary
factor. This interpretation maintains the law of Florida as it existed
prior to the 1949 enactment, except that the dog owner is given an
added defense if he posts a warning sign. It follows that in reality
the title of the act is a misnomer; the statute does not create liability
but rather limits it.
ThoDomx C. HoOK
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See note 33 supra.
GOEx parte Amos, 93 Fla. 5, 14, 112 So. 289, 293 (1927): "When a statute
contravenes or alters a principle of the common law it must be strictly construed, and a statute which is supplementary to the common law does not displace that law any further than is clearly necessary"; Hainlin v. Budge, 56
Fla. 342, 47 So. 825 (1908); Thalheim v. Camp Phosphate Co., 48 Fla. 190,
37 So. 523 (1904).
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